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Abstract To explain agent-identification behaviours, universalist theories in the
biological and cognitive sciences have posited mental mechanisms thought to be
universal to all humans, such as agent detection and face recognition mechanisms.
These universalist theories have paid little attention to how particular sociocultural
or historical contexts interact with the psychobiological processes of agent-identi-
fication. In contrast to universalist theories, contextualist theories appeal to partic-
ular historical and sociocultural contexts for explaining agent-identification.
Contextualist theories tend to adopt idiographic methods aimed at recording the
heterogeneity of human behaviours across history, space, and cultures. Defenders of
the universalist approach tend to criticise idiographic methods because such
methods can lead to relativism or may lack generality. To overcome explanatory
limitations of proposals that adopt either universalist or contextualist approaches in
isolation, I propose a philosophical model that integrates contributions from both
traditions: the psycho-historical theory of agent-identification. This theory investi-
gates how the tracking processes that humans use for identifying agents interact
with the unique socio-historical contexts that support agent-identification practices.
In integrating hypotheses about the history of agents with psychological and epis-
temological principles regarding agent-identification, the theory can generate novel
hypotheses regarding the distinction between recognition-based, heuristic-based,
and explanation-based agent-identification.
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In their search for generalisations and laws, universalist theories in the cognitive
and brain sciences have posited mental mechanisms thought to be universal to all
humans to explain agent-identification behaviours. Such ahistorical1 theories have
paid little attention to how particular sociocultural and historical contexts interact
with the mental processes involved in agent-identification. In contrast to universalist
theories, contextualist theories appeal to particular historical and sociocultural
contexts for explaining agent-identification. Contextualist theories tend to adopt
methods aimed at documenting the heterogeneity of human behaviours across
history, space, and cultures—an approach that is sometimes referred to as
idiographic. To overcome explanatory limitations of proposals that adopt either
universalist or contextualist approaches in isolation, I propose a philosophical model
that integrates contributions from both traditions: the psycho-historical theory of
agent-identification (‘‘psycho-historical theory’’ henceforth). This theory investi-
gates how the tracking processes that humans deploy for identifying agents interact
with the unique historical and sociocultural contexts that support agent-identifica-
tion practices. In integrating hypotheses about the history of agents with
psychological and epistemological hypotheses about agent-identification, the theory
can generate novel predictions regarding the distinction between recognition-based,
heuristic-based, and explanation-based agent-identification.
Universalist and contextualist theories of agent-identification behaviours
The universalist approach
Let us first analyse a series of influential works that adopt the universalist approach.
Fritz Heider’s research (Heider and Simmel 1944; Heider 1958) is an illustrative
example of the universalist approach to agent-identification. Consider Heider and
Simmel’s (1944) influential studies on the attribution of agency. The authors asked
participants to watch a silent film showing the movements of two triangles and a
circle that moved around and within a rectangular shape. In one of these
experiments, the task given to the 34 participants was simply to ‘‘write down what
happened in the picture’’ (1944: p. 245). Surprisingly, without any instructions to do
so, all but one participant spontaneously described the three moving shapes as living
agents or persons with mental states.
Heider and Simmel’s (1944) results support the hypothesis that humans have a
propensity to interpret specific biomechanical patterns in terms of agency, even in cases
where they do not believe that a real agent is present. Their studies played an important
role in the development of Heider’s (1958) ahistorical attribution theory (see also Jones
et al. 1971), which argues that the core concepts of common-sense psychology derive
from a universal conceptual system for interpreting behaviour and attributing causal
dispositions to agents and objects (1958: e.g., p. 14).Heider proposed that the experience
of illusory agency elicitedbyHeider andSimmel’s inanimate stimuliwas a consequence
1 I use the qualifier ahistorical to indicate that a theory does not include historical factors among its core
explanatory constructs (see, e.g., Bullot and Reber 2013b). By historical factors, I mean variables and
causal relations that are unique to, or distinctive to a particular era of evolutionary or human history.
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of the participants’ attribution of causal dispositions to persons understood as apparent
causal origins (Heider 1944: pp. 359–362) and apparent causal units delineated by
principles and ‘‘laws’’ of Gestalt psychology (1944: pp. 362–369; 1958: p. 22)—a form
of psychological constructionism. Although Heider defends this strong form of
constructionism, his model of common sense psychology implies that the attributive
mechanisms that induce the illusory experience of agency are nonetheless routinely
associated with the successful identification of real persons or living agents. However,
surprisingly, Heider does not analyse the contexts inwhich humans can track real agents
reliably. Nor does he discuss the problem of whether or not humans can track and
identify agents reliably.
Ahistorical theories that combine universalist approach with constructionism as
described in Heider’s attribution theory are pervasive in the psychological and brain
sciences. Most prominently, the modularist and mechanistic approaches to agent-
identification (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1995; Bruce and Young 1986), which posit that the
architecture of the human mind is comprised of specialised mechanisms for recognising
agents and attributing mental states, tend to combine universalist and constructionist
assumptions. In these theories, the modules of agent-identification are commonly
assumed to perform intuitive processes, which dual-process theories characterise as Type
1 (Evans and Stanovich 2013). Type 1 processes are contrasted with Type 2 processes,
which are reflective processes typically dependent on higher order cognition andworking
memory.2 Several modularist theories interpret Heider and Simmel’s (1944) findings as
evidence for ‘‘false-positive’’ detections carried out by an evolutionarily ancient,
automatic, fast and parallel perceptualmodule that has evolved to use Type 1 processes to
detect goal-seeking behaviours (see, e.g., Atran and Norenzayan 2004; Baron-Cohen
1995). These accounts conjecture that agent-identification modules are a feature of the
universal architecture of thehumanmind, although theydonot provide detailed biological
and evolutionary evidence for explaining the module’s universality.
Bruce and Young’s (1986) model of face recognition (Fig. 1) is another example
of an influential ahistorical theory that combines universalist and mechanistic
hypotheses. This model seeks to explain face- and person-identification behaviours
by decomposing the mechanism for face recognition into roughly four types of
components and processes.
First, the recogniser’s exposure to diverse views of familiar faces triggers the
structural encoding of invariant configurations of facial features. Second, face
recognition units (FRUs) assess the familiarity of the input provided by structural
encoding. Third, the detection of familiar faces by FRUs activates person identity
nodes (PINs), which provide access to information about each person familiar to the
perceiver. Fourth, the preceding processes enable retrieval of names. Other related
models have highlighted the role of emotions in person-recognition—see boxes and
arrows in grey shades in Fig. 1, which refer to mechanisms posited by Langdon
(2011) and Gerrans (2012), among others.
2 Roughly, on Evans and Stanovich’s (2013) integrative account, the defining feature of Type 1 (intuitive)
processes are that they do not require working memory and are autonomous from higher order cognition.
Typical but not necessary correlates of Type 1 processes include being fast, high capacity, parallel,
nonconscious, automatic and associative. In contrast, Type 2 (reflective) processes require working
memory, cognitive decoupling and simulation.
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The research programme developed by Bruce and Young (1986) and their
followers examines neither the evolutionary history of person-identification
mechanisms nor the interactions of such mechanisms with particular historical
and sociocultural contexts. They assume that historical and sociocultural aspects of
person-identification are factors that can be deemed negligible from standpoint of a
purely psychological explanation.
The association between universalism and psychological constructionism is also
found in other research programmes. For example, it is found in a number of
prediction error theory of cognitive biases and perceptual illusions (see, e.g., Frith
2007: p. 140) and in recent clinical work, in which investigators have used the
ability to experience illusory agents while perceiving Heider and Simmel’s stimuli
as an indicator of normal social cognition (see, e.g., Horan et al. 2009).3
The contextualist approach
In contrast to universalist theories that underappreciate the importance of context-
specific processing, which are typically developed in cognitive psychology and
neuroscience, contextualist methods for explaining agent-identification behaviours
tend to dominate in the humanities and social sciences. These fields include the
Fig. 1 Bruce and Young’s (1986) model of person recognition and additional affective mechanisms
proposed by Langdon (2011; see boxes and arrows in grey shades)
3 Castelli et al. (2000) and Horan et al. (2009), among others, interpret the ability to perceive apparent
animacy has an index of the normal functioning of theory of mind mechanism.
362 N. J. Bullot
123
evolutionary anthropology of social learning (e.g., Richerson and Boyd 2005;
Sterelny 2012), history (e.g., biographical history, see Davis 1983), theories of the
techniques of person identification and tracking (e.g., Cole 2001; Nissenbaum
2010), and research on the identification artistic agency (e.g., Bullot and Reber
2013a).
Instead of considering contextual variability as a factor of negligible importance,
contextualist theories take the variability of identification behaviours across
historical and sociocultural contexts as a genuine explanans, a factor that should
be cited to explain the explanandum phenomenon under consideration. For example,
when discussing the social mechanisms involved in the forensic identification of
recidivist criminals, a social scientist typically appeals to the sociocultural
variability in methods for the forensic identification of persons in order to account
for different patterns of identification behaviours. This is nicely illustrated by Cole’s
(2001) detailed examination of the variability of performance in the identification
methods (e.g., Bertillonage vs latent fingerprints analysis). Cole’s analysis is
contextualist at least in the sense that it analyses a set of social mechanisms for
person-identification that did not exist before a specific historical context: the
context of British and French criminology during and after the nineteenth century.
This type of explanation involves an explanans that accounts for its target
explanandum by appealing to factors that are unique to a particular historical and
sociocultural context.
The puzzling antagonism between universalist and contextualist approaches
It is beyond the scope of this article to review the debates about the distinction
between universalist and contextualist approaches, or nomothetic and idiographic
methods. However, it is important to note that these debates have been controversial
in several disciplines and often appear to be manifestations of the antagonism
between scientific methods and scholarship in the humanities, the so-called ‘‘two
cultures’’ debate (e.g., Bullot and Reber 2013b).
Defenders of the universalist approach have presented methodological objections
to contextualist and idiographic approaches. They have argued that such methods
lack generality and rigorousness, and can lead to relativism or scepticism about
science—see, for example, Lamiell’s (1998) discussion of the psychological
debates.
Advocates of contextualist and idiographic methods have argued that some
universalist theories either fail to describe the variability of sociocultural
phenomena (Ceci et al. 2010; Henrich et al. 2010) or tend to underappreciate the
significance of intrinsically historical phenomena (for an early version of this
argument, see Windelband 1894/1998).
Henrich et al. (2010) have challenged the methodology of the universalist
approach and defended contextualism using cross-cultural research. Their challenge
is based on the claim that universalist generalisations in the cognitive sciences are
too often derived from narrow samples of human populations (Western, Educated,
Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic—or ‘‘WEIRD’’—populations) that, they
argue, mask important patterns of variation. Because a number of universalist
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hypotheses appear false, they conclude that more empirical enquiries that take into
account differences across cultural and historical contexts are needed to rigorously
test the universalist hypotheses of ahistorical theories.
In regard to universalist theories that focus on agent-identification, those that rely
on neuropsychological constructionism can inherit epistemological difficulties
because they underestimate the importance of the distinction between representing
fictive agents and identifying real agents in historical contexts. For example,
Heider’s universalist theory of social attribution and the work of several of his
followers raise an epistemological puzzle. Heider (1944) argued that processes
generating the illusion of tracking agents from Heider and Simmel’s (1944)
inanimate stimuli are involved in the tracking and identification of real agents.
However, how could Heider’s constructivist hypotheses about the same mental
mechanism explain both the correct identification of real agents and the illusory
perception of non-existent agents (e.g., fictive persons imagined as a result of
looking at Heider and Simmel’s stimuli)? To my knowledge, neither Heider’s theory
nor subsequent studies in the psychological and brain sciences provide a framework
for clarifying this fundamental epistemological puzzle.
A psycho-historical theory of agent-identification
As an attempt to integrate explanatory elements from both universalist and
contextualist theories, I propose a psycho-historical theory of agent-identification
(hereafter ‘‘psycho-historical theory’’) in the following sections. This theory
expands the psycho-historical research programme proposed by Bullot and Reber
(2013a, b) and Bullot (in press), which aims to describe relations of dependence
between context-specific phenomena described by historical and social sciences and
context-sensitive mental processes studied by the brain and behavioural sciences.
In contrast to the universalist models discussed above, the psycho-historical
theory posits that psychological enquiry should be connected to a number of
ontological and epistemological questions, which are considered negligible by
universalist theories. For example, in respect to ontology, what is an agent or a
person—that which is identified in agent-identification? In respect to epistemology,
how do humans differentiate the reliable identification of an agent from erroneous
and illusory cases of agent-identification? The psycho-historical framework
provides a platform for integrating ontological and epistemological hypotheses
that address these questions along with psychological questions about the mental
mechanisms involved in agent-identification.
Figure 2 is a schematic of the main relations posited by the theory. The left-hand
side represents an outline of the systems that determine the persistence, behaviours,
and identities of agents. I term these systems agency-making mechanisms, and I
discuss the different senses in which they belong to causal histories (‘‘Ontological
and historical components’’).
The right-hand side represents the second component, introduced below: a
psychological and epistemological model of the mechanisms involved in the
tracking and identification of agents (agent-identification mechanisms). It aims to
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decompose agent-identification behaviours into three types of tracking abilities (i.e.,
recognition-based, heuristic-based, and explanation-based agent tracking). This
component integrates evidence from psychological work on perceptual recognition,
reasoning and heuristics, and episteomological work on folk and scientific
explanation.
Ontological and historical components
The causal history of an agency-making mechanism
In contrast to universalist models of agent-identification in philosophy and
psychology, the novelty of the psycho-historical framework is the inclusion of an
ontological component that refers to the historical ontology of the target of agent-
identification behaviours. This component is represented in the left-hand panel of
Fig. 2. It illustrates the hypothesis that explanations of the persistence of biological
and social agents need to refer to the causal histories of specific mechanisms, which
are coined ‘‘agent-making mechanisms’’ in the theory. Although the majority of the
examples I discuss pertain to the identification of humans, I assume that the theory
can also provide working hypotheses to explain the identification behaviours that
target non-human agents.
Agents and the historicality of the tree of life
An important sense in which agents are historical entities comes from evolutionary
biology. Evolutionary theories tell us that the ontology and lineages of living
organisms can be productively described by the concept of the tree of life, ‘‘a
network of ancestry and descent linking all organisms—all individuals as well as
species—going back to a single root’’ (Godfrey-Smith 2009: p. 14). The tree of life
hypothesis suggests that living individuals and species have core historical
characteristics; for example, their existence is diachronic and each of them is the
outcome of a unique historical network of ancestry and descent.
Agents and their causal-historical interactions with environments
The historical nature of agents is also manifest from the fact that the development of
a real living organism is the outcome of a history of interactions between the
internal parts of the developing agent and physical, biological, or social
environments (Oyama et al. 2001). For example, in addition to aspects of a
physical environment necessary for life, the development of an organism is
supported by a unique environmental niche (Laland et al. 2000) and, in social
species, by a partly cooperative social environment (Sterelny 2012).
The two-way arrows at the left-hand side of Fig. 2 refer to the history of
interactions between the individual agent and its environment. Analysing agent-
environment interactions should not be restricted to the theories of morphological
and psychological development. To explain complex cultural phenomena in agent
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tracking, such as the consequences of social sorting (Hacking 1986) and deception
(see, below, the case of Arnaud du Tilh), it is also necessary to account for agent-
environment interactions.
The fundamental distinction between real (historical) agents and apparent
agency
In contrast to universalist theories of agent identification (see above), the historical
ontology of the psycho-historical theory distinguishes the mechanisms that generate
real agents (left-hand side of Fig. 2 and concepts 1A to 5A in Table 1) from the
mechanisms that generate experience of and beliefs about apparent agency (right-
hand side of Figs. 2, 3; and concepts 1C to 5C in Table 1). Table 1 identifies five
possible concepts of real agency: the behaviours of living, biomechanical,
psychological, intentional, and cooperative agency. According to the mechanistic
approach of the theory, these different types of behaviour are likely to reflect the
causal histories of different types of agency-making mechanism.
The universalist theories discussed above sometimes confound real and apparent
agency. For example, what is loosely referred to as the perception of an ‘‘animate’’
in Heider and Simmel’s (1944) work and the subsequent literature may refer to
either the perception of a real agent or the perception of an apparent agent. This
ambiguous use, which can be prevented by adopting the distinctions presented in
Fig. 2 The psycho-historical theory of agent-identification: solid arrows refer to either causal-historical
generation or feedback loops. Dashed arrows denote three types of tracking (sensitivity) derived from
three types of identification processes




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1, might have contributed to the epistemological puzzle associated with
constructionism in the psychological and brain sciences (see, above, ‘‘The puzzling
antagonism between universalist and contextualist approaches’’).
The types of apparent agency denote the experience of apparent agency that
occurs in the absence of reliable tracking of real agents. For example, according to
Guthrie’s (1993) theory of religion (see also the hypothesis of the hyperactive agent-
detection devices: e.g., Barrett 2000), humans have a bias toward detecting human-
like agency, which can elicit attribution of apparent agency to objects that do not
have agency (i.e., ‘‘false positives’’) in addition to successful detections (‘‘hits’’) in
the detection of real agents.
This distinction between real and apparent agency might appear odd to readers
who, like Heider and others, adopt the constructivist hypothesis that humans use the
mechanisms that generate the illusions of apparent agency to track real agents.
However, that worry can be dissipated by noting the importance of the distinction
between tracking real versus apparent agents to explain errors in agent-identification
(see, below, ‘‘Novelty of the psycho-historical theory’’ and ‘‘The difference
between heuristic-based and explanation-based agent tracking’’) and differentiate
the agent-identification mechanisms, which is what I discuss next.
Psychological and epistemological components
Combining the mechanistic approach with contextualism
As a philosophical framework for explaining agent-identification behaviours, the
psycho-historical theory combines a mechanistic approach to explanation with
contextualist elements.
First, the theory adopt a mechanistic approach (e.g., Bechtel 2008; Craver 2007)
suggesting a way to decompose a tracker’s agent-identification behaviour into
specific tracking mechanisms and processes, such as those involved in recognising a
target agent and reasoning about that target’s causal history. Although the theory
does not fully specify the mechanisms it posits, it assumes that no principled reasons
should prevent researchers from explaining agent-identification behaviours by
decomposing them into tracking mechanisms.
Scholars have used concepts associated with the idea of tracking a target across
time to describe various aspects of the identification of individuals and kinds.4 Here,
I use the term ‘‘tracking’’ broadly to refer to mental and social processes that enable
a subject, acting as a tracker (or enquirer), to become sensitive to causal processes
that might have determined, currently determine, or might come to determine in the
4 The terms tracking (e.g., Bullot and Rysiew 2007; Horowitz et al. 2007) and tracing (e.g., Rips et al.
2006) are often used to denote the ability to keep track of and identify a set of targets over a series of
temporally distinct encounters.
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future the persistence over time and behaviour of an agent (the target5 of the
tracker’s act of identification).6 Examples are detailed below.
Second, the theory is contextualist; and it aims to complement universalist
models of agent-identification with contextualist and epistemological hypotheses
about agent-tracking. The theory is contextualist because it specifies the processes
for tracking agents by reference to the tracker’s sensitivity to historical contexts and
mechanisms. Moreover, it is also contextualist in that it posits that some agent-
tracking processes can only occur in particular historical and sociocultural contexts,
i.e., are context-specific. The bidirectional arrows between tracking types in Fig. 3
are aimed at suggesting that a number of tracking processes are ‘‘scaffolded’’ by
collective and societal mechanisms (Bullot and Reber 2013b; Sterelny 2012; Sutton
2010), and that many tracking functions are performed by groups of human agents
rather than individuals in isolation (see, below, ‘‘The difference between heuristic-
based and explanation-based agent tracking’’).
The psycho-historical theory posits that agent-identification behaviours comprise
at least three types of tracking, based on recognition, heuristics, and inference to the
best explanation. The corresponding tracking relations are represented by ‘‘sensi-
tivity (dashed) arrows’’ in Figs. 2 and 3. Relying on an ontological model of the
types of real and apparent agency (specified in Table 1 and Fig. 2), which
delineates traceable and identifiable agents, the theory is an attempt to ascertain the
limitations and epistemic power of each type of tracking.
Perception-based and recognition-based tracking
Some processes enable a tracker to be sensitive to or predict observable properties
of a target—including the tracker herself—without affording in-depth knowledge of
that target’s unobservable causal properties and history. In the psycho-historical
theory, these behaviours are classified as perception-based and recognition-based
agent tracking (Figs. 2, 3). One of their plausible distinctive characteristics is that
they can operate autonomously from higher order cognition, and therefore have the
profile associated with Type 1 processing.
One of the most interesting Type 1 candidates is face recognition. Several
sources of evidence indicate that the most basic forms of the perceptual recognition
of a face and an agent can, as a Type 1 process, occur autonomously from the
reflective reasoning about the causal history of the agent and possess a deep
phylogenetic ancestry. First, psychological research conducted by Young et al.
(1985) and Bruce and Young (1986), among others, provides evidence that a feeling
of familiarity and identification are different processes. Such models distinguish the
basic stages of face recognition that can trigger a feeling of familiarity (Bruce and
Young 1986: p. 310)—or feeling of resemblance to a known person (Young et al.
1985: p. 517)—from the decision-making process supporting judgments about the
5 Following Cummins (1996), I use target to refer to the entity that a tracking/identification mechanism
has the function to track/identify.
6 Although I do not have space to discuss this point in detail, I assume that the ability to envision past and
future episodes referred to as mental time travel (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007) is likely to play an
important role in agent tracking.
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identity of a person. This distinction corresponds to the distinction between
recognition-based and heuristic-based agent tracking in the psycho-historical theory.
Second, independent empirical evidence suggests that recognition-based agent-
identification can be controlled by phylogenetically ancient Type 1 processes. For
example, ethological research has provided evidence suggesting that non-human
species, especially social species, have capabilities for individual recognition (e.g.,
Cheney and Seyfarth 2007: Ch. 7; Tibbetts and Dale 2007). In ethology, individual
recognition refers to a subset of recognition ‘‘that occurs when one organism
identifies another according to its individually distinctive characteristics’’ (Tibbetts
and Dale 2007: p. 529). Such agent-identification behaviours have been described in
primates and other mammals like dolphins or koalas and several species of birds.
A great variety of perceptual and recognitional processes for agent-identification
could fall into the category of Type 1 processes. For example, plausible Type 1
candidates include processes for the implicit perceptual learning of recurrent
properties of an agent, perceptual recognition of the kinematics and biomechanics of
an agent’s movements, recognition of the face and sounds signaling the presence of
a particular agent, the biasing of attention towards agents and faces, and the
triggering of basic emotional responses to an agent.
Fig. 3 Decomposition of agent-identification behaviours into three types of tracking processes proposed
by the psycho-historical theory. This figure expands the ‘‘tracker’’ component from the right-hand side of
Fig. 2
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Heuristic-based agent tracking
Although fundamental, recongition-based tracking probably cannot perform all
agent-identification tasks reliably, most particularly those tasks in which the tracker
has to predict and identify unobservable or indiscernible properties of the target.
An argument from indiscernible persons and imposters provide a rationale for
thinking that agent-recognition cannot secure the discriminative identification of
indiscernible agents (Bullot in press). Here, ‘‘discriminative identification’’ denotes
the ability to discriminate a target agent from other persons that appear similar or
indiscernible (e.g., Bullot and Rysiew 2007; Evans 1982).
The rationale of the argument is as follows. By most accounts, an important
function of tracking mechanisms based on perceptual recognition is keeping track of
a set of features that can serve to individualise a target agent. However, individual
agents who come from a set of lookalikes, twins, and impersonators can present
configurations of features that are practically indiscernible from one another.
Therefore, one can predict that a basic human recognition-based tracking
mechanism will not be reliable for tracking target agents from a set of indiscernible
agents.
This point can be illustrated with Bruce and Young’s (1986) description of the
mechanism integrating FRUs and PINs (Fig. 1). This mechanism encodes structural
differences among faces taken as inputs to the mechanism for discriminating
individual persons. Because the mechanism relies on visual appearances only, the
mechanism alone does not have the discriminative power to differentiate
perceptually indiscernible people who have different causal histories such
monozygotic twins (e.g., Segal 1999/2000), accidentally similar persons (e.g., Will
and William West7), and impersonators. Because its lacks contextual information
about the distinct histories of indiscernible people, one can predict that the FRU-
PIN mechanism will tend to generate ‘‘false positive’’ and ‘‘miss’’ errors when
attempting to identify indiscernible people with distinct causal histories. This
problem is likely to be shared by any recognition-based tracking mechanism that
tracks targets over time merely on the basis of similarity and feelings of familiarity
(Young et al. 1985).
Because recognition-based tracking alone is not sufficient to fulfil the task
demands of agent-individualisation, the tracker may opt to engage in explanatory
stances (i.e., strategies of enquiry; see Dennett 1987; Keil 2006) in order to better
individualise the target by becoming sensitive to the target’s unobservable causal
history and mechanisms (see Figs. 2, 3). In adopting such stances, the tracker may
deploy strategies and heuristic principles aimed at inferring the target’s causal
history and agency-making mechanisms from the target’s current behaviour or the
traces left by the target’s earlier behaviour. In the heuristic-based tracking of an
agent, searching and identifying an agent relies on judgments and strategies aimed
at providing provisional causal narratives about the history, present, and future of
7 The indiscernible appearances of Will and William West is allegedly what has caused the abandonment
of the Bertillon system in favour of Galton’s fingerprinting system as a technique for forensic
identification (see Cole 2001: pp. 140–142).
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the target. I use the term heuristic-based to refer to processes of identification that
primarily operate by means of learned strategies and ‘‘shortcut’’ rules for facilitating
judgment and decision-making (Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; Tversky and Kahneman
1974).
To illustrate the difference between basic recognition-based and heuristic-based
tracking, consider the task of a tracker, Charles, who has undertaken to identify
Clara and differentiate her from her lookalike, Lea, her monozygotic twin—so-called
‘‘identical’’ twin (Segal 1999/2000). To discriminate Clara from Lea, Charles needs
to develop an ability to track pertinent aspects of Clara’s causal history and agency
in order to discriminate her unique causal history from the causal histories of other
similar individuals, especially Lea. In a number of circumstances, mere recognition-
based tracking during exposure to Clara will not provide Charles with adequate
sensitivity, because the similarity between the faces and voices of twins can induce
considerable confusion (e.g., Sæther and Laeng 2008). To overcome this lack in
sensitivity, Charles can resort to heuristics aimed at tracking subtle differences that
monozygotic twin organisms accumulate, such as reversal effects (‘‘mirror-
imaging’’) in their body structures (see Segal 1999/2000: pp. 22–25) and scars.
Because these differences can be used for discrimination, a simple twin-identifi-
cation heuristic consists in learning to recognise a feature that is distinctive of one
of the lookalike-twins, searching for that unique feature, and ending the search when
that feature has been recognised. Although I focused on distinguishing between
identical twins, the ‘‘identification by unique-feature recognition’’ can be quickly
deployed for individualising an agent in a variety of social contexts (if at least one
its unique trait is known by the tracker). Furthermore, substituting a heuristic based
on recognising a cluster of unique features can further improve this heuristic.
As illustrated by this example and Fig. 3, in heuristic-based tracking, the
tracker’s adoption of a causal or an intentional stance specifies overarching goals
and predictions, which in turn constrain specific search, attention-guidance, and
recognition processes that subserve decision-making regarding agent-identification.
Insofar as this heuristic-based tracking involves the endogenous guidance of
attention broadcast, the use of working memory, and the updating of networks of
semantic information and rules for agent identification (Renoult et al. 2012),
heuristic-based tracking appears to have a Type 2 profile.
Multiple sources of evidence indicate that humans use heuristics for tracking
agents in a variety of sociocultural and historical contexts; and that such heuristics
are involved in both successful and erroneous cases of agent-identification. One
source of evidence is that ‘‘fast and frugal’’ heuristics are quick and do not exceed
the computational and memory requirements of the human mind (Gigerenzer and
Todd 1999). Thus, as argued by Gigerenzer and colleagues, they can be helpful for
the guidance of decision-making in contexts of time pressure, such as in legal and
medical contexts. Identification heuristics are also likely to be of widespread use in
circumstances when a tracker seeks to identify an agent who uses deception to evade
identification, such as in legal reasoning (Hastie and Wittenbrink 2006), forensic
enquiries, and the tracking of people on the Internet by means of data mining
(Nissenbaum 2010).
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Agent-identification heuristics may also provide the novice tracker with opportu-
nities for ‘‘apprentice learning’’ in Sterelny’s (2012) sense: the cross-generational and
cooperative transmission of environmental knowledge and social norms by expert
agents to agents with less expertise. Identification heuristics could contribute to a
tracker’s ability to learn skills and values shared within the community—such as
learning the division of labour in social cooperation, the identification of trustworthy
committed partners, the understanding of hierarchies of social control, and the ability
to decipher the cultural identity of groups (2012: p. 49).
Finally, evidence for the use of heuristics also comes from research on biases
induced by using heuristics. In the domain of agent-identification, several studies
suggest that the tracking of persons’ identities can be biased by contextual information
about the target person’s social roles (Allen and Gabbert 2013), sometimes
communicated by gossip (Anderson et al. 2011). Some of these biases might reflect
a type of tracking that combines recognition-based tracking with heuristics.
In contrast to recognition-based tracking, heuristic-based tracking provide the
tracker with an ability to simulate or infer unobservable past and future states of the
agent from the agent’s behaviour and traces left by this behaviour (Figs. 2, 3). For
example, if Charles knows causal facts about Clara’s history, Charles’ ability to
differentiate Clara from her twin sister by means of the unique-feature heuristic will
provide him with resources for simulating or inferring Clara’s past and future
unobservable behaviour and the agency-makingmechanisms that underlie her actions.
Such an ability to become sensitive to unobservable facts will enable the tracker’s
ability to assemble narratives about the history, unobserved present, and possible
future of agents. Assembling and communicating narratives about the life of a person
demands integration of the different tracking modes used to gather information about
that person (Fivush et al. 2011). For example, Hastie and Wittenbrink (2006) report
evidence indicating that jurors’ decision-making and identifications in court are driven
by narrative-based accounts of the events under scrutiny.
Explanation-based agent tracking
According to the psycho-historical theory, agent-identifications and predictions
derived from either agent-recognition or heuristics can be outperformed by methods
and techniques for tracking that benefit from scientific theories of the target’s
agency-making mechanisms. This is because they equip the tracker with robust
mechanistic models and predictions of the past and future behaviour of the target’s
parts and agency-making mechanisms. Thus, simple heuristic-based agent tracking
is, in principle, distinct from explanation-based agent tracking (see Fig. 2 and ‘‘The
difference between heuristic-based and explanation-based agent tracking’’). Expla-
nation-based tracking corresponds to acts of pursuit and identification of an agent
that derive from the tracker’s use of inferences to the best explanation (Lipton 1991/
2004), which may include mechanistic explanations of the systems that cause the
target’s persistence and agency.
The psycho-historical approach suggests that one should expect a close
connection between tracking methods benefiting from explanations and explana-
tion-generating theories that are the outcome of context-specific cooperative
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endeavours and techniques. For example, an unexpected outcome in a process of
heuristic-based agent tracking may motivate a tracker to instigate novel explanatory
strategies and produce inferences to the most likely explanation based on
contrasting predictions made by different socially shared scientific theories. Such
strategies would override recognition-based and heuristic-based tracking and take
into account predictions derived from theoretical or scientific tools that are context-
specific outcomes of social cooperation (Figs. 2, 3).
Theories can provide the tracker with means to better understand the
relationships between (1) the alleged target’s historical agency and identity and
(2) the underlying mechanisms that determine the target’s historical agency and
identity. Such a mechanistic understanding provides the tracker with means to refine
predictions about the target’s future behaviour or the target’s interactions with its
environmental and social context, subsequently providing means to intervene in or
control the target’s behaviour (Craver 2007).
Novelty of the psycho-historical theory
In this section, I argue that the psycho-historical theory presents a number of novel
hypotheses, arguments, and explanatory advantages when compared to either
ahistorical universalist models or contextualist models that overlook biological and
cognitive factors.
Contrast with theories overlooking heuristic-based and explanation-based agent
tracking
In contrast to the psycho-historical approach, universalist theories of agent-
identification have not systematically investigated the diversity of tracking
processes and social mechanisms involved in human agent-identification. Univer-
salist theories have prioritised the study of recognition-based agent tracking over
other types of tracking such as heuristic-based and explanation-based tracking. To
the best of my knowledge, identifications of agents based on context-specific
heuristics and explanations have not been studied systematically in the psycholog-
ical and brain sciences. The psycho-historical theory provides a framework for
expanding research programmes in these research fields.
The social scaffolding of heuristic-based and explanation-based agent tracking
The psycho-historical theory proposes the novel contextualist hypothesis that
heuristic-based and explanation-based tracking and identification are influenced by
cultural and social factors specific to the tracker’s historical and sociocultural context.
The theory suggests two predictions about heuristic-based tracking. First, socially
scaffolded agent tracking is unlikely to be carried out solely by means of the Type 1
processing of recognition-based agent tracking. Second, because heuristics can induce
biases and errors, the social scaffolding of agent tracking by socially shared heuristics
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can come at the cost of socially spread identification errors (see, below, the case of the
misidentification of Martin Guerre) and social biases (e.g., social stereotyping).
By contrast, typical universalist models of agent-identification have not proposed
this kind of hypothesis because they do not include a model of processing sensitive
to historical and sociocultural contexts. For example, neither Heider’s attribution
theory nor Bruce and Young’s (1986) model of face recognition encompass an
ontological model of the target agent’s historical persistence and sociocultural
context analogous to the left-hand part of Fig. 2.
Historical feelings in agent-identification
Similarly to the psycho-historical theory of artefact appreciation (Bullot and Reber
2013a: p. 132, b: p. 169), the psycho-historical theory also suggests a hypothesis
about historical feelings in agent-identification based on heuristics and explanations.
I use historical feelings to refer to affective responses associated to the identification
of an agent that are biased by the tracker’s knowledge about past historical and
sociocultural contexts. For example, an experience of nostalgia triggered by the
identification of a person who had been a close friend in the past would count as an
historical feeling. Universalist theories have demonstrated that basic emotions such
as fear (LeDoux 1996/1999) provide expressive signals and appraisals that can
trigger or bias agent-identification (Gerrans 2012; Langdon 2011). However,
because universalist theories of agent-identification have not systematically
investigated the relations between historical feelings and agent-identification, the
psycho-historical approach can be used to expand their research programmes.
Epistemology of the tracking of an agent’s causal history
In contrast to universalist theories, the psycho-historical theory proposes novel
epistemological hypotheses regarding the circumstances in which a human tracker
can track herself and other agents reliably. A core hypothesis is that a process of
tracking is reliable at identifying an agent if it can succeed in re-tracing the causal
history of the target agent (either self or other). Reliability in agent-identification
depends on the tracker’s ability to become sensitive to the causal mechanisms that
determine the target’s persistence and causal history (agency-making mechanisms
in Fig. 2). The psycho-historical theory also suggests that recognition-based
tracking can be complemented with heuristic-based and explanation-based tracking
to secure a tracker’s ability to reliably track or predict the unobservable past and
future stages of an agent’s causal history.
The psycho-historical theory suggests a way to classify misidentifications. The
mechanistic architecture of the theory implies that the propensity of each tracking
mechanism to become sensitive to a target can be impaired by events such as damage
to themechanism (e.g., brain injury) or contextually inadequate use of themechanism.
This suggests that different types of agent-misidentification errors can be caused by
dysfunctions of any of the three types of tracking posited by the theory.
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The difference between heuristic-based and explanation-based agent tracking
Heuristics as a source of errors in agent-identification
Although identification errors can, in principle, be generated in any type of agent
tracking, the psycho-historical theory posits that a crucial source of errors derives
from heuristic-based tracking, which must therefore be distinguished from
explanation-based tracking. The reader might be tempted to object that there is
no principled distinction between heuristic-based and explanation-based agent
tracking because both are likely triggered by explanatory stances, and run by
simulation or reasoning. It is possible to rebut this objection by highlighting the
epistemic limitations of tracking based on heuristics.
To further understand the specific limitations of heuristic-based tracking and
justify its distinction from explanation-based tracking, it is useful to analyse, in
some detail, a historical case of impersonation. Here I consider the remarkable case
of Martin Guerre (Davis 1983; for a contemporary case, see Grann 2008).
Martin Guerre, a French peasant born around 1524 in Hendaye, left his wife,
child, and village in 1548. In 1556, eight years after his disappearance, a man
claiming to be Martin Guerre—call him ‘‘New-Martin’’—arrived in the village. For
about 3 years, New-Martin resided with Bertrande Guerre (Martin’s wife) and
Martin’s son. After a complaint lodged by a relative, New-Martin was eventually
suspected of impersonation and tried twice in court. During the final trial in which
the genuine Martin Guerre made a surprising intrusion, Judge Jean de Coras (1561)
and his confederates concluded that New-Martin was an imposter named Arnaud du
Tilh (‘‘Arnaud’’ henceforth). After this revelation Arnaud was sentenced to death for
adultery and fraud and was executed on the 12th of September 1560.
What were the mechanisms that deceived the villagers? After an eight-year
absence, the villagers’ ability to visually recognise Martin’s face might have
become error-prone, which could have resulted in false-positives when they saw a
similar face. On the other hand, it is also possible that the villagers may have
disseminated mistaken identifications as a consequence of using error-prone
heuristics. The analysis of historical sources (e.g., Davis 1983: p. 42, 79, 81, 84)
suggests that the villagers—including Martin’s relatives—may have reasoned on the
basis of heuristics such as this:
If a person who looks like Martin provides an accurate account of intimate
autobiographical details of Martin Guerre’s past, then this person is [probably]
Martin.
The villagers’ decision-making might have been influenced by socially
‘‘contagious’’ false beliefs (Lampinen et al. 2012; Zimbardo and Leippe 1991)
and heuristics that take as a premise a judgement about a psychological trait deemed
to be characteristic of Martin’s identity. Witnesses at the trials might have had
recourse to a misleading inference conflating a mental type distinctive of Martin
with the particular causal history and mechanisms that produced Martin’s agency
(i.e., agency-making mechanisms in Fig. 2):
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If that person who looks like Martin manifests attitudes such as beliefs,
intentions, memories, values typical of Martin Guerre; then this person is
[probably] Martin.
Although Martin’s wife should be an expert at identifying Martin, we can only
propose conjectures regarding whether she was genuinely deceived by Arnaud or
became Arnaud’s accomplice (Davis 1983). Other villagers might have relied on
social learning strategies (Richerson and Boyd 2005), including conformist
inferences about social relationships and the way people’s appearance changes.
Such inferences provide simple heuristics and might reduce dissonance among
potentially conflicting beliefs, as in:
If that person is recognised and accepted by Martin’s wife as her husband, then
this person should be Martin in spite of conflicting accounts’’ (a model-based
bias in the classification of Richerson and Boyd 2005: p. 69);
If most of our villagers identify that person as Martin, then this person should
be Martin (a frequency-based bias).
The former heuristic-based inductive inferences are not necessarily truth-
conducive. In the case of Arnaud’s impersonation of Martin, it is plausible that these
heuristic-based inferences have been instrumental in producing the concatenated
errors8 that made possible Arnaud’s creation of an apparent Martin for ‘‘free
riding’’ Martin’s social network. Relying on the villagers’ use of heuristic-based
tracking and acting in the manner of a ‘‘forger of agency’’, Arnaud was successful at
feigning important features of Martin’s agency such as Martin’s autobiographical
memory, decision-making, and cooperative behaviour (concepts 3C–5C in Table 1:
apparent psychological agency, apparent intentional agency, and apparent cooper-
ative agency). Arnaud provided other agents with cues that were difficult to assess
because they result from a Machiavellian dynamic, that is, he engineered a
‘‘translucent environment’’ (Sterelny 2003, 2012).
Biases and errors generated by social heuristics
In line with research on biases induced by heuristics in statistical reasoning
(Kahneman 2011; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and social heuristics (Hastie and
Wittenbrink 2006), the misleading heuristics in the identification of New-Martin
illustrate how social heuristics can generate biases and errors in agent-identification.
Relevant examples are not limited to social heuristics. For example, the ‘‘simple
twin-identification heuristic’’ heuristic I discussed above (‘‘Heuristic-based agent
tracking’’) will fail to provide a single tracker with the ability to individualise a
target in a pair of twins or lookalikes if the criterion-feature is not uniquely inherent
to the target (shared with another agent) or if it is concealed. Thus, although
integrative research on agent-identification heuristics remains scarce (an important
exception is Young et al. 1985), the frequency of agent-misidentification errors
caused by heuristics is likely to be significant and have major societal
8 Concatenated errors are involved into major societal failure and disasters, see Reason (1990).
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implications—for example errors in distributions of social punishments or benefits
as in the conviction of innocents in judicial trials (Lampinen et al. 2012).
The psycho-historical theory suggests a contextualist account of the detection and
resolution of errors in heuristic-based agent tracking that requires the distinction
between heuristic-based and explanation-based agent tracking. On this account,
errors in heuristic-based agent-identification derive from the tracker’s lack of
sensitivity to the history and agency-making mechanisms that cause the target’s
persistence and behaviour (Fig. 2). In order to detect and overcome an identification
error derived from the use of heuristics, the tracker needs context-sensitive methods
that can outperform heuristics for retracing the actual causal history of the target
and its agency-making mechanisms. Reference to these context-sensitive methods is
missing in the ahistorical universalist models I have considered. The explanation-
based tracking of an agent is context-sensitive in that sense because it can provide
the tracker with models and theories of the target’s causal history, agency-making
mechanisms, and historical context. It is only while using explanation-based
tracking that the tracker opts to engage in strategies that aim to produce inferences
to the best explanation, which draw inferences from the most likely or productive
explanations of the target’s behaviour.
Explanation-based tracking has a Type 2 profile because it should demand that
the tracker engages in the conscious reflection (i.e., metacognitive processes) about
the outcome of other tracking mechanisms (Fig. 3). For example, the tracker may
also benefit from becoming aware of the causal history of processes that led to the
error. Moreover, following a number of accounts of inference to the best
explanation, one can conjecture that inferences to the best explanation rely on an
ability to consciously perform contrastive reasoning (Lipton 1991/2004). Contras-
tive reasoning is the ability to compare and adjudicate ‘‘facts and foils’’, competing
explanations from a pool of potential explanations, or competing hypotheses from a
pool of empirical conjectures.
Heuristic-based identification is distinct from inferences to the best explanation
because heuristics depend on the matching of a limited pool of criteria or rules
rather than on insights provided by causal explanations or theories of the target’s
intrinsic mechanisms. In contrast to explanation-based tracking, heuristic-based
tracking has the profile of a ‘‘satisficing’’ method of decision-making, in which the
decision-maker defines criteria for an aspiration level and ends the search for
alternatives as soon as one that exceeds the aspiration level is encountered
(Gigerenzer and Todd 1999: pp. 12–14; Simon 1990: pp. 9–10). By contrast to
satisficing methods, inference to the best explanation is not tied to an aspiration
level. Opting for explanation-based agent tracking provides the tracker with
opportunities to use contrastive reasoning or simulations to compare and adjudicate
competing explanations of the target’s identity and agency.
These considerations can be illustrated by the forensic discovery by the Judge
Jean de Coras and his confederates that Arnaud du Tilh has impersonated Martin
Guerre. The historical evidence available to us suggests that their final verdict
(Arnaud’s conviction) resulted from explanation-based tracking. Specifically, there
is evidence that the judges’ identification of Arnaud du Tilh as an impersonator
should have resulted from contrastive reasoning aimed at providing the best
378 N. J. Bullot
123
explanation of the discrepant testimonies and narratives about Arnaud and Martin’s
causal histories. Across the variety of contexts for tracking and reasoning based on
contrasting different explanations, there is evidence that Coras used interventions
and trickery to contrastively assess the epistemic value of the numerous testimonies
(e.g., Davis 1983: pp. 77–78). For example, Coras manipulated the defendant’s and
witnesses’ emotional responses to testimonies by means of confrontations of their
conflicting accounts in the context of separate hearings (Davis 1983: p. 84),
theatrical manipulations, and line-ups. The comprehensive explanation of Arnaud’s
and Martin’s historical identities by all the parties was not the outcome of either
tracking based on recognition alone or tracking based on heuristics alone. Rather, it
was the outcome of a long and partially cooperative explanatory process aimed at
retracing the causal histories of both Arnaud and Martin on the basis of a collective
of trackers partially sensitive to the social mechanisms involved in the case and their
own historical context.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, contemporary trackers have access
to a variety of scientific theories of agency-making mechanisms along with agent-
identification techniques derived from such theories. A key oversight of universalist
theories is that they do not account for the fact that the use of such resources by
humans generates empirical evidence about biological, historical, and psychological
persistence that were not available to Jean de Coras and his confederates. Had
Coras’s enquiry benefited from relevant scientific explanations of the biological
mechanisms that differentiate Arnaud and Martin’s organisms and link them to
different causal genealogies, this forensic enquiry would have been greatly
facilitated. For example, theories of inheritance mechanisms and DNA fingerprint-
ing techniques (e.g., Pena and Chakraborty 1994) could have provided the forensic
enquirers with means to assess the likelihood of the hypothesis that Arnaud du Tilh
(Martin’s impersonator) is the father of Martin’s son. DNA fingerprinting would
provide highly likely explanations that the impersonator is not the father’s of
Martin’s son, and such biological assessment could have been combined with
available sources of psychological and social evidence to undermine the
impersonator’s claim, and precipitate the discovery of the imposture. This example
illustrates that knowledge about identity-making and agency-making mechanisms
can dramatically improve the reliability and predictive force of tracking and
identification. It therefore demonstrates that actual processes of agent tracking are
impacted by sociocultural factors and methods specific to particular historical
contexts, a fact neglected by ahistorical universalist theories.
Conclusion
Evidence gathered by universalist theories of agent-identification suggests that the
basic recognition mechanisms for agent-identification are easily triggered by
specific stimuli such as biomechanical patterns and face-like objects. However, this
approach to agent-identification is far from providing a comprehensive explanatory
framework for understanding the tracking of agents and persons. The more
comprehensive account proposed by the psycho-historical theory is that, although
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agent tracking is typically triggered by mechanisms of perception, the most
historically-sensitive and explanatory adequate modes of agent tracking should
derive from integrating the outputs of several types of tracking mechanisms in
heuristic-based and explanation-based agent tracking. By means of retrospective
and predictive inferences, heuristic-based and explanation-based tracking use
context-sensitive strategies that enable the tracker’s ability to identify unobservable
facts and causal mechanisms that determine the persistence and agency of the
tracked agent. As noted above, however, even processes of tracking by means of
simple heuristics can lead a tracker to make systematic misidentification errors and
confound an apparent agent with a real agent.
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